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DO ENTREPRENEURS MAKE PREDICTABLE
MISTAKES? EVIDENCE FROM CORPORATE
DIVESTITURES
PETER G. KLEIN AND SANDRA K. KLEIN
A fter a brief lull in the early 1990s, the market for corporate controlbecame increasingly active toward the end of the decade. Both 1996and 1997 set new records for the number of U.S. merger filings, and
1998, 1999, and 2000 brought high-profile “mega-mergers” in financial serv-
ices, energy, telecommunications, pharmaceuticals, and automobiles. In bank-
ing alone, for example, a wave of mergers over the last decade has led to wide-
spread industry restructuring and consolidation. While total industry activi-
ty continues to expand, the number of U.S. banks and banking organizations
both fell by almost 30 percent between 1988 and 1997 (Berger, Demsetz, and
Strahan 1999).
Like other business practices that do not conform to textbook models of
competition, mergers, acquisitions, and financial restructurings have long
been viewed with suspicion by some commentators and regulatory authorities.
However, the academic literature clearly suggests that corporate restructurings
do, on average, create value. Event studies of acquisitions consistently find
positive average combined returns to acquirer and target shareholders. As
summarized by Jensen (1991, p. 15), “the most careful academic research
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strongly suggests that takeovers—along with leveraged restructurings prompt-
ed by the threat of takeover—have generated large gains for shareholders and
for the economy as a whole.” These gains, historically about 8 percent of the
combined value of the merging companies, “represent gains to economic effi-
ciency, not redistribution between various parties” (Jensen 1988, p. 23).1
At the same time, however, several studies have found a sharp divergence
between market participants’ pre-merger expectations about the post-merger
performance of merging firms and the firms’ actual performance rates.
Ravenscraft and Scherer’s (1987) large-scale study of manufacturing firms, for
example, found that while the share prices of merging firms did on average
rise with the announcement of the proposed restructuring, post-merger prof-
it rates were unimpressive. Indeed, they find that nearly one-third of all acqui-
sitions during the 1960s and 1970s were eventually divested. Ravenscraft and
Scherer conclude that acquisitions, particularly diversifying acquisitions, typ-
ically promote managerial “empire building” rather than efficiency. While
acknowledging that product and capital markets eventually discipline poorly
performing firms, forcing divestitures and other restructurings, Ravenscraft
and Scherer (p. 217) argue for tighter government restrictions on mergers, par-
ticularly diversifying acquisitions and acquisitions financed by stock: “When
the roads are strewn with wrecks, government officials cannot rest content
because the tow trucks, ambulances, and hearses are doing a good job remov-
ing the remnants and clearing the right-of-way.”2
Implicit in this criticism is the idea that divestitures of previously acquired
assets expose past errors, and that these errors should have been foreseen
(and perhaps prevented, if regulators had been sufficiently empowered).
Certain types of acquisitions, it is claimed, are more likely to be later divest-
ed, so managers should generally avoid them. If such acquisitions occur, this
is then cited as evidence for widespread agency problems. In this sense, the
takeover wave of the 1980s is typically understood as an “undoing” of the ear-
lier, conglomerate merger wave of the 1960s and early 1970s. According to
conventional wisdom, the 1980s was a period of respecialization or “refocus,”
showing the failures of unrelated diversification. The three decades from 1960
to 1990 thus represent a “round trip of the American corporation” (Shleifer
and Vishny 1991, p. 54).
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1On the gains from mergers, acquisitions, and other restructurings, see also the sur-
veys by Jensen and Ruback (1983), Jarrell, Brickley, and Netter (1988), Roll (1988),
Romano (1992), and Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001).
2Jensen (1986, 1993) argues similarly that diversifying acquisitions resulted from
widespread agency problems in corporations, though he does not recommend any regu-
latory response: “The legal/political/regulatory system is far too blunt an instrument to
handle the problems of wasteful managerial behavior effectively” (1993, p. 850). Instead,
he advocates alternative forms of organization such as leveraged buyout associations and
venture capital funds (see especially Jensen 1989).
This view is based partly on evidence from studies of the conglomerate
period by Rumelt (1974, 1982), Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987, 1991), Porter
(1987), Kaplan and Weisbach (1992), and others who find no evidence that
unrelated diversification brought long-term benefits to the firms that diversi-
fied.3 Combined with evidence of negative stock-market returns to diversifi-
cation during the 1980s (Bhagat, Shleifer, and Vishny 1990; Lang and Stulz
1994; Berger and Ofek 1995; Comment and Jarrell 1995), many observers con-
clude that unrelated diversification is per se inefficient, and that the conglom-
erate era is best understood as an agency phenomenon.
The conventional wisdom on conglomerate sell-offs can be challenged on
at least four grounds. First, divestitures of previously acquired assets do not
necessarily show that the original acquisitions were failures. Weston (1989)
argues that divestitures occur for a variety of reasons, such as changes in cor-
porate strategies and antitrust rules, and not necessarily poor performance.
Kaplan and Weisbach (1992) studied 217 large acquisitions completed
between 1971 and 1982 and found that while 43.9 percent had been divested
by 1989, only about a third of those divestitures were responses to poor
post-merger performance.4 Thus the mere fact that many acquisitions are later
divested does not prove widespread managerial misconduct.
Second, the market for corporate control is already highly regulated, and
it is difficult to draw from current and recent experience strong conclusions
about how unhampered capital markets would work. For example,
Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987, 1991), Porter (1987), and other critics propose
particular sequences of inefficient and efficient restructurings: diversifying,
empire-building acquisitions in the 1960s and early 1970s, then efficient
divestitures in the 1980s. But why did entrepreneurs make systematic mis-
takes during the conglomerate period, but not later? Can changes in the legal,
political, and regulatory environments account for clusters of errors during
specific periods?
Third, even if divestitures are seen as revealing prior mistakes, the failure
of a particular acquisition does not necessarily indicate a failure of the under-
lying acquisition strategy. Certain kinds of acquisitions—for example, acqui-
sitions of firms in knowledge-intensive, high-technology industries—may be
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3Servaes (1996) also finds that conglomerate firms in the 1960s were valued at a
discount relative to specialized firms. However, Matsusaka (1993) and Hubbard and
Palia (1999) show that market participants rewarded conglomerate acquisitions during
this period, and Klein (2001) offers valuation evidence consistent with the event-study
results.
4Other empirical studies of asset sales and restructurings include Hite, Owens, and
Rogers (1987); Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz (1994); John and Ofek (1995); and Schlingemann,
Stulz, and Walkling (2000). These papers look at divestitures more generally, and not only
at divestitures of previously acquired assets.
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inherently riskier than others. If the returns from a successful integration of
the target’s activities with the firm’s existing activities are sufficiently high,
then the acquisition has positive expected value, even if it is more likely to fail
than a safer acquisition. Matsusaka (2001) offers this kind of interpretation of
corporate diversification. Diversifying acquisitions represent experiments, as
firms try various combinations of businesses, seeking those that match their
capabilities (in the sense of Penrose 1959; Nelson and Winter 1982; and
Wernerfelt 1984). After learning their capabilities, firms divest acquisitions
that turn out to be poor matches. In this sense, divestitures reflect successful
experiments—the acquirer has learned that the target’s industry is not a good
match for its capabilities. Such “match-seeking” firms will actively acquire
and divest over time.5
This article elaborates a fourth, “Austrian” interpretation of corporate
divestitures, one that builds on the three just mentioned. Austrian writers
view market competition as a dynamic, rivalrous process that unfolds gradu-
ally through time—a “discovery procedure,” in Hayek’s (1978) famous phrase.
The future holds genuine surprises, not merely a closed set of events whose
probabilities are unknown. From this perspective, the long-term success of an
acquisition, like any entrepreneurial action, cannot be “predicted.”
Entrepreneurs rely on judgment, or what Mises (1966) calls understanding.
Understanding is intuitive, subjective, and qualitative, and thus inherently
imperfect. For this reason, divestitures of underperforming subunits may be
seen as efficient responses to unforeseen changes in industry and regulatory
conditions, or more generally, to poor judgments by profit-seeking entrepre-
neurs. Ex post viability is not a good indicator of ex ante efficiency.
We begin with the theory of entrepreneurship proposed by Mises (1966),
posing it as a challenge to the agency view of divestitures. We then present
empirical evidence that the long-term performance of corporate acquisitions
cannot, in general, be predicted by measures of agency conflicts. Instead,
divestitures of previously acquired assets are more likely when firms are
experimenting, learning, and otherwise trying to deal with uncertainty about
5Sanchez, Heene, and Thomas suggest that the same is true for networks and alliances.
In a dynamic market context, longevity of interfirm alliances is
not necessarily an indicator of successful collaboration. A suc-
cession of short-term alliances by a firm, for example, may sug-
gest that the firm has a superior ability to learn from its part-
ners, or that it may have superior ability to quickly reconfigure
its chain of firm-addressable resources in response to changing
competitive and market conditions. (1966, p. 28)
Mosakowski (1997) also offers an experimentation theory of diversification (without
looking at subsequent divestitures).
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future conditions. We also show that mistaken acquisitions are more likely
under certain circumstances, namely during periods of intense, industry-spe-
cific regulatory activity. Our own research on restructuring (Klein and Klein
2001) shows that significantly higher rates of divestiture follow mergers that
occur in a cluster of mergers in the same industry. As argued by Mitchell and
Mulherin (1996), Andrade and Stafford (1999), and Andrade, Mitchell, and
Stafford (2001), mergers frequently occur in industry clusters, suggesting that
mergers are driven in part by industry-specific factors, such as regulatory
shocks. When an industry is regulated, deregulated, or re-regulated, econom-
ic calculation becomes more difficult, and entrepreneurial activity is ham-
pered. It should not be surprising that poor long-term performance is more
likely under those conditions.
This last result is consistent with the view, expressed repeatedly in the
Austrian literature, that entrepreneurial error is associated with govern-
ment intervention in the marketplace—in particular, with government own-
ership of property and interference with the price system. Mises (1990)
famously showed that economic calculation is not possible without private
property in all markets, especially markets for factors of production. The
Austrian business-cycle literature (Mises 1934; Hayek 1935; Garrison 2001)
suggests that entrepreneurial errors are more likely under government-
sponsored credit expansion. This article makes a related argument:
Entrepreneurial decisions to make acquisitions that will later be regretted,
and divested, are more likely in the wake of government intervention in
particular industries.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. The first section
reviews the Austrian literature on entrepreneurship, uncertainty, and eco-
nomic calculation, suggesting that the ex post success of entrepreneurial
actions cannot be forecasted based on generally available information. The
second section introduces recent theory and evidence on the reasons for merg-
ers and divestitures, contrasting two opposing views of sell-offs: empire-build-
ing and experimentation. The third section reviews some empirical evidence
on the pre-merger causes of divestiture, challenging the generally accepted,
empire-building explanation. The final section concludes. 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP, PROFIT, AND LOSS
Entrepreneurship, as Mises (1966) conceives it, is the act of bearing uncer-
tainty. Production takes time, so entrepreneurs must purchase factors of pro-
duction in the present (paying today’s prices, which are known), in anticipa-
tion of revenues from the future sale of the product (at tomorrow’s prices,
which are uncertain). Entrepreneurial profit or loss is the difference between
these revenues and the initial outlays, less the general rate of interest. As such,
profit is the reward for successfully bearing uncertainty. Successful entrepre-
neurs, or “promoters” in Mises’s terminology, are those who make accurate
forecasts of future prices and receive returns greater than their outlays. Those
whose forecasts are less accurate earn losses. Promoters who consistently
make poor forecasts quickly find themselves unable to secure any further
resources for investment and eventually exit the market.
This entrepreneur–promoter is absent from textbook models of competi-
tive general equilibrium in which uncertainty is defined away, replaced by
probabilistic risk. In these models it is possible to anticipate which actions,
on average, would be profitable. In a world of “true” (structural, rather than
parametric) uncertainty, however, profit opportunities do not exist “out
there,” waiting to be realized by anyone willing to take a specified action.
Instead, profit opportunities are created through entrepreneurial action. As
emphasized in one strand of modern Austrian literature, entrepreneurial skill
is not simply luck or “alertness,” the ability to recognize profit opportunities
that appear, ex nihilo, to the discoverer. Rather, entrepreneurship is judgment:
“Alertness is the mental quality of being on the lookout for something new;
judgment is the mental process of assigning relevance to those things we
already know” (High 1982, p. 167). In this context,
promoter–entrepreneurs are those who seek to profit by actively promoting
adjustment to change. They are not content to passively adjust their . . .
activities to readily foreseeable changes or changes that have already
occurred in their circumstances; rather, they regard change itself as an
opportunity to meliorate their own conditions and aggressively attempt to
anticipate and exploit it. (Salerno 1993, p. 123; see also Hülsmann 1997)
All entrepreneurs, particularly those who operate in financial markets, use
economic calculation as their primary decision-making tool.6 By economic cal-
culation, Mises means simply the use of present prices and anticipated future
prices to compare present costs with expected future benefits. In this way the
entrepreneur decides what goods and services should be produced, and what
methods of production should be used to produce them.
The business of the entrepreneur is not merely to experiment with new
technological methods, but to select from the multitude of technological-
ly feasible methods those which are best fit to supply the public in the
cheapest way with the things they are asking for most urgently. (Mises
1980, p. 110)
To make this selection, the entrepreneur must weigh the costs and expected ben-
efits of various courses of action, and for this he needs the cardinal numbers
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6Klein (1999) argues that financial-market entrepreneurship is a particularly impor-
tant form of entrepreneurial activity, though it has received little attention in the Austrian
literature.
provided by money prices. Monetary calculation, then, requires private prop-
erty and market prices (Mises 1966, p. 229).
Mises’s famous 1920 essay on economic calculation under socialism is not
so much about socialism per se; it is an argument about the role of prices for
capital goods (Rothbard 1993, pp. 547–78; Klein 1996). Entrepreneurs make
decisions about resource allocation based on their expectations about future
prices and the information contained in present prices. To make profits, they
need information about all prices, not only the prices of consumer goods but
the prices of factors of production. Without markets for capital goods, these
goods can have no prices, and therefore entrepreneurs cannot make judg-
ments about the relative scarcities of these factors. In short, resources cannot
be allocated efficiently. In any environment, then—socialist or not—where a
factor of production has no market price, a potential user of that factor will be
unable to make rational decisions about its use. Stated this way, Mises’s claim
is simply that efficient resource allocation in a market economy requires well-
functioning asset markets.
Despite Mises’s explicit focus on entrepreneurship, much of modern pro-
duction theory—indeed, the entire neoclassical theory of the firm—focuses not
on entrepreneurs, but managers. The traditional theory of profit maximiza-
tion is nearly always told from the perspective of the manager, the agent who
operates the plant, not that of the owner, who supplies the capital to fund the
plant. Yet owners control how much authority to delegate to operational man-
agers, so capitalists are, in an important sense, the ultimate decision makers.
To understand the firm, then, we must focus on the actions and plans of the
suppliers of financial capital, the capitalist–entrepreneurs.
It is true, of course, that when capitalist–entrepreneurs supply resources
to firms, they usually delegate to managers the day-to-day responsibility for
use of those resources. The resulting possibility for managerial discretion is
of course the focal problem of the modern literature on corporate finance and
the theory of the firm. The literature on corporate governance identifies a vari-
ety of mechanisms by which shareholders can limit this discretion. Internally,
owners may establish a board of directors to oversee the actions of managers.
They can use performance-based compensation to motivate managers to act
in the owners’ interests. They can adopt a particular organizational form, such
as the “M-form” structure, in which managerial discretion is more easily kept
in check (Williamson 1975). Finally, they can rely on competition within the
market for managers to limit the discretionary behavior of top-level manage-
ment (Fama 1980).
Even more important are external forces that help align managers’ inter-
ests with those of shareholders.7 Competition in the product market, for
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7Jensen (1993) argues that internal control mechanisms are generally weak and ineffec-
tive, while external control mechanisms—where allowed to function—are typically superior.
example, assures that firms whose managers engage in too much discre-
tionary behavior will fail, costing the managers their jobs. In countries where
universal banking is permitted, large equity holders such as banks can exer-
cise considerable influence over managerial behavior. The external gover-
nance mechanism that has received the most attention, of course, is the mar-
ket for ownership itself, the market for corporate control. Anticipating Manne
(1965), Mises (1966) makes the general point that financial markets play a
vital disciplinary role:
[T]he changes in the prices of common and preferred stock and of corpo-
rate bonds are the means applied by the capitalists for the supreme con-
trol of the flow of capital. The price structure as determined by the
speculations on the capital and money markets and on the big commodi-
ty exchanges not only decides how much capital is available for the con-
duct of each corporation’s business; it creates a state of affairs to which
the managers must adjust their operations in detail. (p. 303)
The market for corporate control thus places strict limits on the ability of man-
agers to pursue their own goals rather than those of the capitalist–entrepreneurs.
The Austrian view of the entrepreneurial market process sheds light on
the debate over the effectiveness of the takeover mechanism in providing
managerial discipline. A common concern is the belief that financial markets
produce too few disciplinary takeovers, due to a free-rider problem associat-
ed with tender offers (Scharfstein 1988). Critics point out that if the differ-
ence between the current (undervalued) price of the firm and its after-
takeover market value is common knowledge, then the target firm’s share-
holders will refuse to tender their shares until the current price is bid up,
appropriating a share of the returns to the acquiring firm. These critics con-
clude that regulation, not the takeover market, should be used to discipline
managers.
The flaw in this argument is that it assumes perfect knowledge by
investors. The typical shareholder will not usually have the same information
as incumbent managers, outside “raiders,” and other specialists. It is not in
the small shareholder’s interest to learn these details; that is why he delegates
such responsibilities to the managers in the first place. As Hayek (1945)
described it, there is a “division of knowledge” in society. The raider who dis-
covers a difference between a firm’s current market value and its potential value
under new management has an opportunity for an entrepreneurial profit (less
the transaction costs of takeover). Because shareholders have delegated these
responsibilities, they will not usually earn a share of this profit. Moreover, the
post-takeover market value of the firm is uncertain; the raider’s profit, if he is
successful, is the reward for bearing this uncertainty. In this sense the takeover
artist is a Misesian capitalist–entrepreneur. Successful takeover specialists earn
pure entrepreneurial profit; the rest suffer entrepreneurial loss. Raiders thus
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have powerful incentives to undertake disciplinary restructurings, and this
places strict limits on managerial discretion.
We should therefore be cautious in attributing the eventual divestiture of
many acquisitions, particularly during the 1960s and 1970s, to managerial
motives. Moreover, the claim that the acquisitive conglomerates of the 1960s
and 1970s were inefficient is inconsistent with recent evidence that during
those years, diversifying acquisitions—particularly those that created internal
capital markets—tended to increase the market values of the acquiring firms
(Matsusaka 1993; Hubbard and Palia 1999; Klein 2001). In light of this evi-
dence, “[t]he simple view that the 1980s ‘bust-ups’ were a corrective to past
managerial excesses is untenable” (Matsusaka 1993, p. 376). In short, both the-
ory and empirical evidence cast doubt on the conventional wisdom that cor-
porate managers made systematic, predictable mistakes by acquiring (often
unrelated) subunits during the 1960s and 1970s, and that financial-market par-
ticipants made systematic mistakes by approving these acquisitions.
MERGERS, SELL-OFFS, AND EFFICIENCY: THEORY AND EVIDENCE
Why, in general, do firms expand and diversify through merger? Why do they
sometimes retreat and “refocus” through divestiture? The theory of merger is
a subset of the theory of the optimal size and shape of the firm, a relatively
undeveloped area in the Austrian literature. Klein (1996) argues for a modi-
fied Coasian, or contractual, view of firm boundaries, in which the limits to
organization are given by the need to perform economic calculation using
prices generated in external markets. Other writers see the Austrian approach
as more congenial to the resource-based theory of the firm, defining firms’
capabilities in terms of Hayekian tacit knowledge (Langlois 1992, 1994;
Minkler 1993). In either case, we can think of merger or takeover as a response
to a valuation discrepancy: Acquisition occurs when the value of an existing
firm’s assets is greater to an outside party than to its current owners. Put dif-
ferently, merger can be a response to economies of scope, in that the value of
the merging firms’ assets combined exceeds their joint values separately.8 As
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8Two popular explanations for multiproduct economies of scope center on internal cap-
ital markets and strategic resources. According to the internal-capital-markets hypothesis, as
expressed by Alchian (1969); Williamson (1975); Gertner, Scharfstein, and Stein (1994);
and Stein (1997), internal capital markets have advantages where access to external funds
is limited. The central office of the diversified firm can use informational advantages,
residual control rights, and its ability to intervene selectively in divisional affairs to allo-
cate resources within the firm better than the external capital markets would do if the divi-
sions were stand-alone firms. In the resource-based view, the firm is regarded as a stock
of knowledge, establishing a range of competence that may extend across multiple prod-
uct lines. Excess profits or supranormal returns are seen as rents accruing to unique fac-
tors of production (Montgomery and Wernerfelt 1988) and firms diversify because they
have excess capacity in these unique factors.
with any voluntary exchange, the transaction is (ex ante) advantageous to
both parties, and should thus be welfare-enhancing. 
New combinations of corporate assets can generate efficiencies by replac-
ing poorly performing managers ( Jensen and Ruback 1983; Mitchell and Lehn
1990), creating operating synergies (Weston, Chung, and Hoag 1990, pp.
194–95), or establishing internal capital markets (Alchian 1969; Williamson
1975; Gertner, Scharfstein, and Stein 1994; Stein 1997). In particular, consid-
erable evidence suggests that the market for corporate control disciplines
incumbent management. For example, Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988)
found that firms with lower Tobin’s q-ratios are more likely to be targets of
takeovers. Tobin’s q measures the ratio of the firm’s market value to the
replacement cost (or book value) of its assets. Because firms with low market-
to-book ratios have low expected cash flows relative to the amount of invested
capital, the market-to-book ratio can be interpreted as a measure of the firm’s
investment opportunities (Smith and Watts 1992; Gaver and Gaver 1993), or as
a measure of managerial inefficiency or agency conflict within the firm (Lang,
Stulz, and Walkling 1991). Low-q firms are the most likely takeover targets. 
Given the benefits of takeovers, why are many mergers later “reversed” in
a divestiture or spin-off? Here we distinguish between two basic views. The
first, which may be termed empire-building, holds that entrenched managers
make acquisitions, often paying with the acquiring firm’s (inflated) stock, pri-
marily to increase their own power, prestige or control. These acquisitions
produce negligible efficiency gains, and are thus more likely to be divested ex
post. Most important, because the acquiring firm’s motives are suspect, such
acquisitions are ex ante inefficient; neutral observers can predict, based on
pre-merger characteristics, that these mergers are unlikely to be viable over
time. By permitting these acquisitions, capital-market participants are also
guilty of systematic error. Admittedly, in the empire-building view, markets
did eventually correct these mistakes with the restructurings of the 1980s.9
Still, farsighted regulators could have reduced social costs by limiting such
acquisitions in the first place.
A second view, which we term entrepreneurial market process, acknowl-
edges that unprofitable acquisitions may be mistakes ex post, but argues that
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9This raises the question of why, if managers were sufficiently entrenched to make
inefficient acquisitions in the first place, would they not remain sufficiently entrenched to
hold on to poorly performing targets, rather than divest them and risk revealing their
underlying objectives? Boot (1992, p. 1402) argues that an entrenched manager will not
divest because the external market will take divestiture as an admission of failure and a
bad signal of his ability. The argument that divestitures indicate agency problems thus
assumes a change in corporate control between the original acquisitions and the later
divestitures.
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poor long-term performance does not indicate ex ante inefficiency. In the mar-
ket-process perspective, a divestiture of previously acquired assets may mean
simply that profit-seeking entrepreneurs have updated their forecasts of future
conditions or otherwise learned from experience. As Mises (1966, p. 252)
puts it, “the outcome of action is always uncertain. Action is always specula-
tion.” Consequently,
the real entrepreneur is a speculator, a man eager to utilize his opinion
about the future structure of the market for business operations promising
profits. This specific anticipative understanding of the conditions of the
uncertain future defies any rules and systematization. (p. 585, emphasis
added)10
As discussed above, this notion of entrepreneurial decision-making under
uncertainty squares with recent theories of acquisitions as a form of experi-
mentation (Mosakowski 1997; Boot, Milbourn, and Thakor 1999; Matsusaka
2001). In these models, profit-seeking entrepreneurs can learn their own
capabilities only by trying various combinations of activities, which could
include diversifying into new industries. Firms may thus make diversifying
acquisitions even if they know these acquisitions are likely to be reversed in a
divestiture. This process generates information that is useful for revising
entrepreneurial plans, and thus an acquisition strategy may be successful
even if individual acquisitions are not. In these cases, the long-term viability
of an acquisition may be systematically related to publicly observable, pre-
merger characteristics associated with experimentation, but not characteris-
tics associated with managerial discretion.
To explain the particular pattern of mergers and acquisitions observed,
over the last several decades, market-process explanations must appeal to
changes in the legal, political, competitive, or regulatory environments that
affect the ability of entrepreneurs to anticipate future conditions. Why, for
instance, was it particularly difficult for entrepreneurs to forecast the success
of acquisitions in the 1960s and 1970s? Why did entrepreneurs feel a greater
need to experiment with various combinations of businesses during those
years? 
One possibility is that complex organizations with active internal capital
markets were necessary in the 1960s, but became less important after capital
markets were deregulated in the 1970s. The investment community in the
1960s has been described as a small, close-knit group where competition was
minimal and peer influence strong (Bernstein 1992). As Bhide (1990, p. 76)
10Mises (1949, pp. 110–15) replaces Knight’s (1921) distinction between risk and
uncertainty with that between “class probability,” in which members of a class of events
share certain characteristics, and “case probability” in which each event is a unique case.
puts it, “internal capital markets . . . may well have possessed a significant
edge because the external markets were not highly developed. In those days,
one’s success on Wall Street reportedly depended far more on personal con-
nections than analytical prowess.” During that period, the financial markets
were relatively poor sources of capital. In 1975, the SEC deregulated broker-
age houses and removed its rule on fixed-price commissions. The effect of
deregulation, not surprisingly, was to increase competition among providers
of investment services. “This competitive process has resulted in a significant
increase in the ability of our external capital markets to monitor corporate
performance and allocate resources” (p. 77). As the cost of external finance
has fallen, firms have tended to rely less on internal finance, and thus the
value added from internal-capital-market allocation has fallen. Consequently,
firms have adopted simpler, more “focused” structures that rely more heavily
on external capital markets and outsourcing, possibly explaining some of the
divestitures observed in the last two decades.
ARE DIVESTITURES PREDICTABLE? EVIDENCE FROM A DURATION STUDY
This section summarizes our own research (Klein and Klein 2001) on the
causes of divestiture. If acquisitions are most often symptoms of managerial
empire-building, as suggested by Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987), Porter
(1987), and other critics, then pre-merger characteristics associated with
high levels of managerial discretion should be systematically related to the
long-term failure and reversal of these acquisitions. In the market-process
view, by contrast, long-term performance should be correlated only with pre-
merger characteristics associated with experimentation, rapidly changing
environments, or knowledge-intensive industries. Our empirical research
finds little support for the empire-building hypothesis, and much stronger
support for the market-process view. Specifically, we find that most charac-
teristics typically associated with empire-building are poor predictors of
merger duration. The evidence also suggests that divestiture is more likely
when the original acquisition is driven by industry-specific competitive or
regulatory shocks. 
We studied 222 pairs of firms that merged during the 1977–1983 period.
Of the 222 acquisitions, 64, or almost 30 percent, had been divested by July
1995. We used a duration or “hazard” model to study the effects of pre-merg-
er characteristics on the time to divestiture. Duration models help explain
how exogenous factors, unobserved factors, and time itself affect the average
duration until some discrete event (in our case, divestiture) occurs. Duration
analysis allows us to see, historically, how characteristics of the acquiring
and acquired firms affect the likelihood that the acquired firm will later be
divested. 
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To study the effects of pre-merger characteristics on average merger dura-
tion, we estimated a hazard regression of duration (measured as the natural log-
arithm of the number of days) on a constant and on a series of potentially exoge-
nous factors. For assessing the empire-building hypothesis, we included three
characteristics associated with high levels of managerial discretion: relatedness
of target and acquirer, differences in price-earnings ratios, and the medium of
payment. Relatedness addresses the common view that managers deliberately
pursue unrelated targets to expand their control or make themselves more valu-
able to the firm. Following Kaplan and Weisbach (1992), we examined this
claim by constructing a dummy variable equal to one if the acquiring and tar-
get firm share at least one two-digit SIC code and zero otherwise.
Differences in price-earnings ratios are commonly seen as another indi-
cator of merger motives. Merger critics have often suggested that acquiring
firms grow and prosper by “bootstrapping.” This refers to the practice where-
by bidding firms seek targets with low P/E ratios to boost their reported earn-
ings per share. It is trivially mathematically true that when a firm with a high
P/E multiple acquires a firm with a low P/E multiple and pays with its own
stock, the acquirer’s earnings per share will rise, simply because the com-
bined earnings of the two firms will then be divided by a smaller number of
total shares outstanding. Hence, it is argued, acquiring firms can expand rap-
idly, with market approval, as managers exploit this accounting opportunity.11
Of course, this argument assumes market participants could be systemat-
ically fooled by a simple algebraic trick. Admittedly, much more complicated
financial and balance-sheet manipulations are often used in corporate-control
transactions: bidders in the 1960s and 1970s sometimes financed acquisitions
with convertible bonds, convertible preferred stocks, and other unique instru-
ments. Although investors could (and eventually did) require that earnings be
reported on a “fully diluted” basis, to take account of these manipulations,
Malkiel (1990, p. 61) reports that “most investors in the middle 1960s ignored
such niceties and were satisfied only to see steadily and rapidly rising earn-
ings.” However, there is no evidence that bootstrapping was either prevalent
or successful (Barber, Palmer, and Wallace 1995; Matsusaka 1993).
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11This is Malkiel’s (1990) explanation for the conglomerate boom:
[T]he major impetus for the conglomerate wave of the 1960s was
that the acquisition process itself could be made to produce
growth in earnings per share. . . . By an easy bit of legerdemain,
[conglomerate managers] could put together a group of compa-
nies with no basic potential at all and produce steadily rising
per-share earnings. (p. 58)
For a more balanced discussion of the bootstrapping practice see Lynch (1971, pp.
55–56).
Nonetheless, we included a measure of relative P/E ratios to see if acquirers
that choose targets with lower P/E ratios are historically more likely to divest
those same targets, implying that bootstrapping does tend to fool investors, as
increases in reported earnings disguise inefficient acquisitions.
We also included a series of dummy variables to represent the medium of
payment used in the merger. Several theories suggest that how an acquisition
is financed can affect performance. First, the bootstrapping technique
described above works only for mergers financed by stock swap. Second,
Jensen (1986) holds that financing takeovers by issuing debt serves to disci-
pline the acquiring firm’s management by reducing post-merger discretion in
the use of free cash flow. If true, we would expect entrenched managers to
avoid making acquisitions using debt, opting for stock swaps instead.
In the market-process or experimentation view, by contrast, divestitures
occur when the acquirer receives new information about the target after the
merger has taken place. Plausibly, some relevant characteristics of potential
target firms can be learned only by experience, forcing entrepreneurs to revise
their plans accordingly. What kinds of targets are most likely to have
unknown characteristics? Large firms engage in more activities than smaller
firms, so potential acquirers have more to learn. On the other hand, smaller
firms are less likely to have been written about in the business press, so one
could plausibly argue that private information is a bigger problem for small tar-
gets.12 We include target size in our regressions to see if either aspect is rele-
vant. Firms in rapidly changing, knowledge-intensive industries are also likely
to have characteristics hidden from potential acquirers. To capture this effect,
we created a dummy variable based on two-digit SIC codes. The dummy takes
a value of one if the target is in any of the following industries: computers (sys-
tems, software, and services), medical products, communications, aerospace,
and miscellaneous high-tech industries. We also included target R&D because
R&D is difficult to value, especially to outsiders, and thus firms in R&D-
intensive industries are likely to have hidden characteristics. Potential acquir-
ers would know potential targets’ R&D expenditures (which is reported), but
this may not give the acquirers much information on the quality of the
research or even the content of the R&D. 
Finally, unrelated acquisitions, as discussed above, may be a form of
experimentation, as firms try new combinations of activities to find those that
best fit their existing capabilities. Although match-seeking acquisitions are
more likely to be divested they can still be part of a value-maximizing acqui-
sition strategy. Our relatedness variable, described above, can proxy for
match-seeking behavior. However, the best way to identify match-seeking
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12However, in our sample, all targets are themselves publicly traded corporations, so
lack of media exposure is unlikely to be a problem.
firms is to look directly at historical patterns of acquisitions and divestitures.
A firm with a history of repeated acquisitions and divestitures, especially
acquisitions into unrelated industries, is likely to be a match-seeker, and thus
any current acquisition is more likely to be divested. Unfortunately, our
merger sample is too small to compile detailed acquisition and divestiture
histories on individual acquirers. As a first approximation, we searched our
sample for acquiring firms with at least one previous acquisition that was
later divested within a few years of the acquisition. We created a dummy vari-
able equal to one if the acquirer in a particular merger met these criteria, and
zero otherwise.13
As noted above, periods of intense merger activity in particular industries
may be responses to industry-specific competitive or regulatory shocks.
Mitchell and Mulherin (1996), Andrade and Stafford (1999), and Andrade,
Mitchell, and Stafford (2001) argue that mergers tend to occur in industry
clusters, suggesting that industry-specific factors are important. Mitchell and
Mulherin argue that corporate takeovers are often the most cost-effective way
for industries to respond to these shocks. Moreover, they add, “because
takeovers are driven in part by industry shocks, it is not surprising that many
firms exhibit volatile performance following takeovers, with actual failures fol-
lowing some negative shocks” (Mitchell and Mulherin 1996, p. 195). 
To capture the effects of industry-specific shocks such as regulatory and
tax changes, we included measures of industry clustering, both for acquirers
and for targets, in our regressions. We did find substantial clustering in our
sample. For example, slightly more than half of the mergers during 1977–1983
period occurred in only five of the thirty-seven (two-digit) SIC industries in
our sample, both for acquirers and targets, with three-quarters occurring in
ten industries. We constructed clustering variables by counting the number of
mergers in each two-digit SIC category in each year and creating variables for
each merger corresponding to the number of mergers occurring (a) within
one year of the merger under observation (including the year before the merg-
er, the year of the merger, and the year after the merger, to span a three-year
window), (b) within two years of the merger (a five-year window), and (c)
within the entire sample (a seven-year window). If risky acquisitions or
increased levels of experimentation tend to appear during periods of indus-
try-specific shocks, then these clustering variables will have negative and sig-
nificant effects on the length of time to divestiture.
Our results challenge the empire-building hypothesis and offer evidence
more consistent with the market-process view. Of the variables associated with
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13Mosakowski (1997) suggests that younger firms face greater uncertainty, or a higher
level of “causal ambiguity,” about the best use of their resources, which implies that firm
age could also be a proxy for match-seeking behavior. 
agency problems, only relatedness has a statistically significant effect on merg-
er duration. Neither P/E differences nor the medium of payment has a statisti-
cally significant coefficient in any of several specifications. The coefficient on
relatedness is positive, meaning that related acquisitions are less likely, on
average, to be divested (as in Kaplan and Weisbach 1992). However, the coef-
ficient on relatedness is also consistent with the market-process explanation.
Of the five variables associated with this view, the coefficient on relatedness
is positive and significant, the coefficient on target R&D is negative and sig-
nificant, and the coefficient on the match-seeking indicator is negative and
significant, all as expected. The coefficients on target size and the indicator
for high-technology industries have the expected signs (positive and negative,
respectively) but are not statistically significant.
Overall, our findings suggest that the divestitures in our sample are not,
on average, the predictable result of unwise acquisitions. Rather, divestitures
follow experimentation and learning, healthy characteristics of a market econ-
omy. Moreover, industry clustering appears to have a regular effect on average
merger duration. The coefficients on our acquirer-clustering variables are con-
sistently negative and statistically significant. (The coefficients on the target-
clustering variables, by contrast, are not statistically significant.) This sug-
gests that volatile performance does follow shocks, as suggested by Mitchell
and Mulherin (1996).
This finding is consistent with the view that firms make acquisitions when
faced with increased uncertainty (see Spulber 1992, pp. 557–59). Regulatory
interference could be a major cause of such uncertainty. As discussed above,
government intervention makes economic calculation more difficult, and can
ultimately render calculation impossible. When faced with increased regula-
tory interference, firms apparently respond by experimenting, making riskier
acquisitions, and consequently making more mistakes, ex post.
CONCLUSIONS
Do entrepreneurs make predictable mistakes? Theory and evidence suggest oth-
erwise. Contrary to the conventional wisdom on mergers and sell-offs, divesti-
tures of previously acquired assets do not necessarily indicate that the original
acquisitions were mistakes. Indeed, empire-building motives do not seem to be
systematically related to long-term merger performance. Instead, divestitures
are more likely to be associated with experimentation, learning, and other
socially beneficial activities.
Acquisitions are uncertain endeavors, and the entrepreneur–promoter—
along with the manager to whom he delegates authority—is a speculator. If the
consequences of his actions were determinate, he would not be an entrepre-
neur, but rather, as some economic theories seem to treat him, “a soulless
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automaton” (Mises 1966, p. 585). However, the future can never be known
with certainty; long-term profit and loss cannot be predicted based on current
information. As Mises explains:
What distinguishes the successful entrepreneur and promoter from other
people is precisely the fact that he does not let himself be guided by what
was and is, but arranges his affairs on the ground of his opinion about the
future. He sees the past and the present as other people do; but he judges
the future in a different way. (p. 585)
As discussed above, it is hardly surprising that these judgments are less than
perfect. The relevant question for policy is whether there is a feasible alterna-
tive to market-based corporate governance. Our reading of the political-econ-
omy literature leaves us doubtful that such an alternative exists.
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